The previous questions and this topic in general bring this quote to mind. I'm not sure if it is at all helpful to you here, but it was useful to me when I was distinguishing between phenomenology and phaneroscopy while analyzing the details between Merleau-Ponty and Heraclitus in the light of Peirce.
..... Quote
..... "It is because of this habit of letting constant factors slip from consciousness that we constantly fall into the error of thinking of the sense-awareness of a particular factor in nature as being a two-termed relation between the mind and the factor. For example, I perceive a green leaf. Language in this statement suppresses all reference to any factors other than the percipient mind and the green leaf and the relation of sense-awareness. It discards the obvious inevitable factors which are essential elements in the perception, I am here, the leaf is there; and the event here and the event which is the life of the leaf there are both embedded in a totality of nature which is now, and within this totality there are other discriminated factors which it is irrelevant to mention. Thus, language habitually sets before the mind a misleading abstract of the indefinite complexity of the fact of sense-awareness.
What I now want to discuss is the special relation of the percipient event which is 'here' to the duration which is ' now.' This relation is a fact in nature, namely the mind is aware of nature as being with these two factors in this relation.
Within the short present duration the ' here ' of the percipient event has a definite meaning of some sort. This meaning of 'here' is the content of the special relation of the percipient event to its associated duration. I will call this relation 'cogredience.' Accordingly, I ask for a description of the character of the relation of cogredience. The present snaps into a past and a present when the 'here' of cogredience loses its single deter- minate meaning. There has been a passage of nature from the ' here ' of perception within the past duration to the different * here ' of perception within the present duration. But the two 'heres' of sense-awareness within neighbouring durations may be indistinguishable. In this case there has been a passage from the past to the present, but a more retentive perceptive force might have retained the passing nature as one complete present instead of letting the earlier duration slip into the past. Namely, the sense of rest helps the integration of dura- tions into a prolonged present, and the sense of motion differentiates nature into a succession of shortened durations. As we look out of a railway carriage in an express train, the present is past before reflexion can seize it. We live in snippits too quick for thought. On the other hand the immediate present is prolonged according as nature presents itself to us in an aspect of unbroken rest. Any change in nature provides ground for a differentiation among durations so as to shorten the present. But there is a great distinction between self-change in nature and change in external nature. Self-change in nature is change in the quality of the standpoint of the percipient event. It is the break up of the 'here' which necessitates the break up of the present duration. Change in external nature is compatible with a prolongation of the present of contemplation rooted in a given standpoint. What I want to bring out is that the preservation of a peculiar relation to a duration is a necessary condition for the function of that duration as a present duration for sense-aware- ness. This peculiar relation is the relation of cogredience between the percipient event and the duration."
End Quote - Alfred North Whitehead, 'The Concept of Nature', pgs 108-109
I'm curious here that it seems the Vervaeke's order: participatory, perspectival, procedural, propositional is not the same order as perception, experience, understanding, sharing. Where the two earlier phases are switched:(i.e., experience, perception). Can you resolve the difference?
It true that the fit is not perfect, which is to be expected. Later I will explore these differences more minutely. However, in my opinion the order is as I wrote in the post. Perspectival knowing is about foregrounding/backrounding and about the personal experience. This is very much the Experience phase.
In the perception phase there are no real differences. The sign is still entangled in the qualitative continuum. Therefore, there can't be real salience or abstracted personal experience.
Actually, in the perception phase there isn't even information. For this reason, I am not sure that affordances are really part of the perception phase as they seem like signs (doorknob signifies the possibility of opening the door).
So my question about this compability is this: is the participatory knowing actually part of the experience phase? The perception phase seems to be more fundamental than participatory knowing. But I'm still thinking about this.
The previous questions and this topic in general bring this quote to mind. I'm not sure if it is at all helpful to you here, but it was useful to me when I was distinguishing between phenomenology and phaneroscopy while analyzing the details between Merleau-Ponty and Heraclitus in the light of Peirce.
..... Quote
..... "It is because of this habit of letting constant factors slip from consciousness that we constantly fall into the error of thinking of the sense-awareness of a particular factor in nature as being a two-termed relation between the mind and the factor. For example, I perceive a green leaf. Language in this statement suppresses all reference to any factors other than the percipient mind and the green leaf and the relation of sense-awareness. It discards the obvious inevitable factors which are essential elements in the perception, I am here, the leaf is there; and the event here and the event which is the life of the leaf there are both embedded in a totality of nature which is now, and within this totality there are other discriminated factors which it is irrelevant to mention. Thus, language habitually sets before the mind a misleading abstract of the indefinite complexity of the fact of sense-awareness.
What I now want to discuss is the special relation of the percipient event which is 'here' to the duration which is ' now.' This relation is a fact in nature, namely the mind is aware of nature as being with these two factors in this relation.
Within the short present duration the ' here ' of the percipient event has a definite meaning of some sort. This meaning of 'here' is the content of the special relation of the percipient event to its associated duration. I will call this relation 'cogredience.' Accordingly, I ask for a description of the character of the relation of cogredience. The present snaps into a past and a present when the 'here' of cogredience loses its single deter- minate meaning. There has been a passage of nature from the ' here ' of perception within the past duration to the different * here ' of perception within the present duration. But the two 'heres' of sense-awareness within neighbouring durations may be indistinguishable. In this case there has been a passage from the past to the present, but a more retentive perceptive force might have retained the passing nature as one complete present instead of letting the earlier duration slip into the past. Namely, the sense of rest helps the integration of dura- tions into a prolonged present, and the sense of motion differentiates nature into a succession of shortened durations. As we look out of a railway carriage in an express train, the present is past before reflexion can seize it. We live in snippits too quick for thought. On the other hand the immediate present is prolonged according as nature presents itself to us in an aspect of unbroken rest. Any change in nature provides ground for a differentiation among durations so as to shorten the present. But there is a great distinction between self-change in nature and change in external nature. Self-change in nature is change in the quality of the standpoint of the percipient event. It is the break up of the 'here' which necessitates the break up of the present duration. Change in external nature is compatible with a prolongation of the present of contemplation rooted in a given standpoint. What I want to bring out is that the preservation of a peculiar relation to a duration is a necessary condition for the function of that duration as a present duration for sense-aware- ness. This peculiar relation is the relation of cogredience between the percipient event and the duration."
End Quote - Alfred North Whitehead, 'The Concept of Nature', pgs 108-109
I'm curious here that it seems the Vervaeke's order: participatory, perspectival, procedural, propositional is not the same order as perception, experience, understanding, sharing. Where the two earlier phases are switched:(i.e., experience, perception). Can you resolve the difference?
It true that the fit is not perfect, which is to be expected. Later I will explore these differences more minutely. However, in my opinion the order is as I wrote in the post. Perspectival knowing is about foregrounding/backrounding and about the personal experience. This is very much the Experience phase.
In the perception phase there are no real differences. The sign is still entangled in the qualitative continuum. Therefore, there can't be real salience or abstracted personal experience.
Actually, in the perception phase there isn't even information. For this reason, I am not sure that affordances are really part of the perception phase as they seem like signs (doorknob signifies the possibility of opening the door).
So my question about this compability is this: is the participatory knowing actually part of the experience phase? The perception phase seems to be more fundamental than participatory knowing. But I'm still thinking about this.
This question might become clearer if you move from a phenomenological interpretation of semiosis to a existentialist one influenced by Heidegger.
I think Vervaekes “Agent Arena” might be better understood as “Zuhandenheit” (ready-to-hand).